Rumours of a coup against Chinese President Xi Jinping have resurfaced in recent weeks—spreading rapidly across social media and geopolitical forums. But far from revealing instability in Beijing, these narratives offer more insight into persistent Western misreading of China’s political system.
Since 1949, when the People’s
Republic of China was founded, Western discourse has recurrently speculated
about the imminent collapse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). From Mao
Zedong’s revolutionary era to Xi’s consolidation of power today, these
narratives have ranged from hopeful to conspiratorial—almost always missing the
mark.
Mao, Moscow, and Misconceptions
During the Cold War, such
narratives were in full swing. Mao’s China was diplomatically isolated,
expelled from the United Nations, and branded by both the West and the Soviet
Union in different hues of ideological extremism. In 1957, Mao publicly
labelled the USSR as a “social imperialist” power, sharply diverging from
Soviet policy.
The tension became even more
complex with India. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s decision to grant asylum
to the Dalai Lama in 1959 infuriated Beijing. The 1962 Sino-Indian war, rooted
in long-standing territorial disputes, also played into broader Cold War
calculations.
Even then, Western pundits
misread China's internal resilience. When Western media declared Mao too ill to
lead during the Cultural Revolution, a photograph of him swimming across theYangtze at age 76 silenced critics.
Tiananmen and the Persistence of
Myths
In the late 1980s, as the Soviet
Union teetered, many in the West saw China’s 1989 Tiananmen protests as a
harbinger of regime collapse. Some even hoped this unrest might delay the
return of Hong Kong and Macau. But Beijing endured.
I recall a 1987 dinner with
Chinese scholars in Pittsburgh where I warned that China’s cycles of upheaval
had deep historical roots—but that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remained
the ultimate backstop. That warning proved prescient.
The 1989 protests, allegedly
encouraged by CIA-backed operations, escalated with symbols like the replica
Statue of Liberty. Western optimism peaked, but the PLA acted, and those dreams
were crushed.
When the Dalai Lama received the
Nobel Peace Prize that year, many in Beijing saw it as ideological meddling,
wrapped in liberal values. Yet, under Deng Xiaoping, China stayed its
course—reforming economically while holding firm politically.
Xi Jinping and the Structure of
Power
Today, President Xi holds three
critical positions:
- General Secretary of the
Communist Party
- President of the People’s Republic
- Chairman of the Central
Military Commission
These are not ceremonial. The PLA
does not serve the state—it answers to the Party, through the Central Military
Commission. This arrangement makes a conventional coup, as imagined in Western
commentary, virtually impossible.
Xi has reaffirmed Mao’s legacy
and Deng’s reforms. His vision includes finishing the “incomplete revolution”
through reunification with Taiwan and shifting policy from wealth creation to
common prosperity. Contrary to popular Western assumptions, he has not
disavowed the Cultural Revolution as past leaders did.
Narrative Wars in the Digital Age
What we are witnessing is not a
shift in Chinese stability, but in Western strategy. With hard power
confrontation giving way to narrative warfare, rumours have become geopolitical
tools.
Think tanks, editorial pages, and
online influencers amplify these claims. Yet they rarely reckon with the
institutional reality of the Chinese system—one designed to prevent exactly the
kind of military or political coup being imagined.
Western assumptions, built on
liberal-democratic frameworks, struggle to interpret China’s distinct
governance model. But wishful thinking does not equate to evidence.
Conclusion: Facts vs Fantasy
Yes, China has its challenges:
economic pressures, internal factionalism, and demographic concerns. But so do all
large powers. The recurring narrative of Xi’s ouster is less about facts than
fantasy.
If anything, the renewed chatter
around coups and instability reflects how much the West needs to believe that
China will eventually “fail.” As we enter a new phase of strategic rivalry,
that hope is not a substitute for sound geopolitical analysis.
Prof. Suresh Deman is
Honorary Director at the Centre for Economics & Finance, a UNEP/UNCTAD
Consultant, and Visiting Professor. He writes on international political
economy, China’s foreign policy, and strategic affairs.
Rumours of a Coup in China Say More About the West
Than Beijing
Persistent fantasies about Xi Jinping’s downfall reveal a chronic
misunderstanding of China’s political structure
By Prof. Suresh Deman
Fresh rumours of a coup in China,
swirling again across social media and some geopolitical commentary outlets,
reveal little about China’s internal dynamics and much more about the Western
obsession with instability at the heart of Beijing.
Since the founding of the
People’s Republic in 1949, such narratives have surfaced repeatedly. From Mao
Zedong’s era to the present, Western commentators have forecast — or even hoped
to trigger — internal breakdowns in the Chinese system. But time and again,
China has confounded these predictions.
During the Cultural Revolution
(1966–76), Western pundits claimed Mao was incapacitated or even dead. That
myth collapsed when photos emerged of Mao, then 76, swimming across the Yangtze
River. China, for all its internal convulsions, adapted and endured.
In the Cold War years, Beijing
was diplomatically isolated and expelled from the United Nations. Tensions
between Mao and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev over revolutionary leadership
and territorial disputes came to a head in 1957. Mao soon branded the USSR a
“social imperialist” power — famously remarking, “If American imperialism is an
olive branch, then social imperialism is a poisonous arrow.”
Meanwhile, India’s decision under
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to grant asylum to the Dalai Lama deepened
tensions, culminating in the 1962 war between China and India — a conflict
shaped not just by borders but by Cold War alignments.
By the 1980s, as the Soviet Union
began to unravel, the West turned its attention to China’s own internal
discontent. The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests became a lightning rod for hopes
of regime collapse. That same year, the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to
the Dalai Lama was viewed in Beijing as Western meddling cloaked in liberal
ideals.
I recall warning Chinese
delegates in 1987, during a dinner hosted by the Chinese Students’ Association
in Pittsburgh, not to fall into what I called “the American trap.” I cautioned
that China’s periodic upheavals had never resulted in the military’s sidelining
— the PLA had always remained central.
In Tiananmen, protestors erected
a replica of the Statue of Liberty. Western observers predicted revolution.
Yet, despite Deng Xiaoping’s repudiation of the Cultural Revolution, Maoist
slogans resurfaced on both sides of the protest. When the PLA intervened, hopes
of another Hong Kong-like colonial chapter for China were decisively crushed.
China instead pursued a unique
trajectory. Deng’s reforms spurred dramatic economic growth while maintaining
centralised political control. The Soviet collapse was avoided not by
liberalisation but by learning from it.
Under Xi Jinping, China has
continued that trajectory — and then some. His speeches at the CPC Centenary
and Party Congress underline three key aims: to reinforce the CPC’s
Marxist-Leninist foundations, complete what Beijing calls the “unfinished
revolution” by reunifying Taiwan (peacefully or by force), and transition from
wealth accumulation to “common prosperity.” Unlike his predecessors, Xi has not
distanced himself from the Cultural Revolution, but instead has embraced Mao’s legacy
alongside Deng’s reforms.
As China has grown into a global
power — economically, militarily, and diplomatically — the Western narrative
has shifted. Confrontation now takes place not only in military terms, but in
the realm of information: disinformation campaigns, think tank briefings, and
editorial fear-mongering.
But these stories rarely reflect
the political structure they purport to analyse.
China’s power rests on three
interlinked institutions: the Communist Party, the State, and the Military. All
three are led by Xi Jinping — as General Secretary of the Party, President of
the State, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC).
Unlike in many Western systems,
China’s military — the People’s Liberation Army — is not subordinate to the
state. It answers directly to the Party, through the CMC. The idea of a
military coup, where generals depose a civilian leader, misunderstands this setup
entirely. In China, there is no such division.
The recurring coup narrative is
thus a projection — a product of Western liberal assumptions imposed on a
system that does not fit them.
Yes, China faces internal
dissent, elite factionalism, and policy challenges, as all large countries do.
But rumours of Xi’s downfall are not rooted in on-the-ground reality. They are
geopolitical wishful thinking.
As the global order becomes
increasingly multipolar and narrative warfare intensifies, foreign policy debates must be grounded in structure, not fantasy. A deeper, more
informed understanding of China’s political system is not only overdue — it’s
essential.
Prof. Suresh Deman is
Honorary Director at the Centre for Economics & Finance, a UNEP/UNCTAD Consultant,
and Visiting Professor. He writes on international political economy, China’s
foreign policy, and strategic affairs.
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