Rumours of a coup against Chinese President Xi Jinping have resurfaced in recent weeks—spreading rapidly across social media and geopolitical forums. But far from revealing instability in Beijing, these narratives offer more insight into persistent Western misreading of China’s political system.
Since 1949, when the People’s
Republic of China was founded, Western discourse has recurrently speculated
about the imminent collapse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). From Mao
Zedong’s revolutionary era to Xi’s consolidation of power today, these
narratives have ranged from hopeful to conspiratorial—almost always missing the
mark.
Mao, Moscow, and Misconceptions
During the Cold War, such
narratives were in full swing. Mao’s China was diplomatically isolated,
expelled from the United Nations, and branded by both the West and the Soviet
Union in different hues of ideological extremism. In 1957, Mao publicly
labelled the USSR as a “social imperialist” power, sharply diverging from
Soviet policy.
The tension became even more
complex with India. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s decision to grant asylum
to the Dalai Lama in 1959 infuriated Beijing. The 1962 Sino-Indian war, rooted
in long-standing territorial disputes, also played into broader Cold War
calculations.
Even then, Western pundits
misread China's internal resilience. When Western media declared Mao too ill to
lead during the Cultural Revolution, a photograph of him swimming across theYangtze at age 76 silenced critics.
Tiananmen and the Persistence of
Myths
In the late 1980s, as the Soviet
Union teetered, many in the West saw China’s 1989 Tiananmen protests as a
harbinger of regime collapse. Some even hoped this unrest might delay the
return of Hong Kong and Macau. But Beijing endured.
I recall a 1987 dinner with
Chinese scholars in Pittsburgh where I warned that China’s cycles of upheaval
had deep historical roots—but that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remained
the ultimate backstop. That warning proved prescient.
The 1989 protests, allegedly
encouraged by CIA-backed operations, escalated with symbols like the replica
Statue of Liberty. Western optimism peaked, but the PLA acted, and those dreams
were crushed.
When the Dalai Lama received the
Nobel Peace Prize that year, many in Beijing saw it as ideological meddling,
wrapped in liberal values. Yet, under Deng Xiaoping, China stayed its
course—reforming economically while holding firm politically.
Xi Jinping and the Structure of
Power
Today, President Xi holds three
critical positions:
- General Secretary of the
Communist Party
- President of the People’s Republic
- Chairman of the Central
Military Commission
These are not ceremonial. The PLA
does not serve the state—it answers to the Party, through the Central Military
Commission. This arrangement makes a conventional coup, as imagined in Western
commentary, virtually impossible.
Xi has reaffirmed Mao’s legacy
and Deng’s reforms. His vision includes finishing the “incomplete revolution”
through reunification with Taiwan and shifting policy from wealth creation to
common prosperity. Contrary to popular Western assumptions, he has not
disavowed the Cultural Revolution as past leaders did.
Narrative Wars in the Digital Age
What we are witnessing is not a
shift in Chinese stability, but in Western strategy. With hard power
confrontation giving way to narrative warfare, rumours have become geopolitical
tools.
Think tanks, editorial pages, and
online influencers amplify these claims. Yet they rarely reckon with the
institutional reality of the Chinese system—one designed to prevent exactly the
kind of military or political coup being imagined.
Western assumptions, built on
liberal-democratic frameworks, struggle to interpret China’s distinct
governance model. But wishful thinking does not equate to evidence.
Conclusion: Facts vs Fantasy
Yes, China has its challenges:
economic pressures, internal factionalism, and demographic concerns. But so do all
large powers. The recurring narrative of Xi’s ouster is less about facts than
fantasy.
If anything, the renewed chatter
around coups and instability reflects how much the West needs to believe that
China will eventually “fail.” As we enter a new phase of strategic rivalry,
that hope is not a substitute for sound geopolitical analysis.
Prof. Suresh Deman is
Honorary Director at the Centre for Economics & Finance, a UNEP/UNCTAD
Consultant, and Visiting Professor. He writes on international political
economy, China’s foreign policy, and strategic affairs.
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