China Bashing - Coup Runour Mongering

COUP MONGERING AS PRESIDENT XI REFUSED TO FLINCH 

Rumours of a coup against Chinese President Xi Jinping have resurfaced in recent weeks—spreading rapidly across social media and geopolitical forums. But far from revealing instability in Beijing, these narratives offer more insight into persistent Western misreading of China’s political system.

Since 1949, when the People’s Republic of China was founded, Western discourse has recurrently speculated about the imminent collapse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). From Mao Zedong’s revolutionary era to Xi’s consolidation of power today, these narratives have ranged from hopeful to conspiratorial—almost always missing the mark.

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Mao, Moscow, and Misconceptions

During the Cold War, such narratives were in full swing. Mao’s China was diplomatically isolated, expelled from the United Nations, and branded by both the West and the Soviet Union in different hues of ideological extremism. In 1957, Mao publicly labelled the USSR as a “social imperialist” power, sharply diverging from Soviet policy.

The tension became even more complex with India. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s decision to grant asylum to the Dalai Lama in 1959 infuriated Beijing. The 1962 Sino-Indian war, rooted in long-standing territorial disputes, also played into broader Cold War calculations.

Even then, Western pundits misread China's internal resilience. When Western media declared Mao too ill to lead during the Cultural Revolution, a photograph of him swimming across theYangtze at age 76 silenced critics. 

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Tiananmen and the Persistence of Myths

In the late 1980s, as the Soviet Union teetered, many in the West saw China’s 1989 Tiananmen protests as a harbinger of regime collapse. Some even hoped this unrest might delay the return of Hong Kong and Macau. But Beijing endured.

I recall a 1987 dinner with Chinese scholars in Pittsburgh where I warned that China’s cycles of upheaval had deep historical roots—but that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remained the ultimate backstop. That warning proved prescient.

The 1989 protests, allegedly encouraged by CIA-backed operations, escalated with symbols like the replica Statue of Liberty. Western optimism peaked, but the PLA acted, and those dreams were crushed.

When the Dalai Lama received the Nobel Peace Prize that year, many in Beijing saw it as ideological meddling, wrapped in liberal values. Yet, under Deng Xiaoping, China stayed its course—reforming economically while holding firm politically.

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Xi Jinping and the Structure of Power

Today, President Xi holds three critical positions:

• General Secretary of the Communist Party
• President of the People’s Republic
• Chairman of the Central Military Commission

These are not ceremonial. The PLA does not serve the state—it answers to the Party, through the Central Military Commission. This arrangement makes a conventional coup, as imagined in Western commentary, virtually impossible.

Xi has reaffirmed Mao’s legacy and Deng’s reforms. His vision includes finishing the “incomplete revolution” through reunification with Taiwan and shifting policy from wealth creation to common prosperity. Contrary to popular Western assumptions, he has not disavowed the Cultural Revolution as past leaders did.

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Narrative Wars in the Digital Age

What we are witnessing is not a shift in Chinese stability, but in Western strategy. With hard power confrontation giving way to narrative warfare, rumours have become geopolitical tools.

Think tanks, editorial pages, and online influencers amplify these claims. Yet they rarely reckon with the institutional reality of the Chinese system—one designed to prevent exactly the kind of military or political coup being imagined.

Western assumptions, built on liberal-democratic frameworks, struggle to interpret China’s distinct governance model. But wishful thinking does not equate to evidence.

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Conclusion: Facts vs Fantasy

Yes, China has its challenges: economic pressures, internal factionalism, and demographic concerns. But so do all large powers. The recurring narrative of Xi’s ouster is less about facts than fantasy.

If anything, the renewed chatter around coups and instability reflects how much the West needs to believe that China will eventually “fail.” As we enter a new phase of strategic rivalry, that hope is not a substitute for sound geopolitical analysis.

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Prof. Suresh Deman is Honorary Director at the Centre for Economics & Finance, a UNEP/UNCTAD Consultant, and Visiting Professor. He writes on international political economy, China’s foreign policy, and strategic affairs.

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Rumours of a Coup in China Say More About the West Than Beijing
Persistent fantasies about Xi Jinping’s downfall reveal a chronic misunderstanding of China’s political structure
By Prof. Suresh Deman

Fresh rumours of a coup in China, swirling again across social media and some geopolitical commentary outlets, reveal little about China’s internal dynamics and much more about the Western obsession with instability at the heart of Beijing.

Since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, such narratives have surfaced repeatedly. From Mao Zedong’s era to the present, Western commentators have forecast — or even hoped to trigger — internal breakdowns in the Chinese system. But time and again, China has confounded these predictions.

During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), Western pundits claimed Mao was incapacitated or even dead. That myth collapsed when photos emerged of Mao, then 76, swimming across the Yangtze River. China, for all its internal convulsions, adapted and endured.

In the Cold War years, Beijing was diplomatically isolated and expelled from the United Nations. Tensions between Mao and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev over revolutionary leadership and territorial disputes came to a head in 1957. Mao soon branded the USSR a “social imperialist” power — famously remarking, “If American imperialism is an olive branch, then social imperialism is a poisonous arrow.”

Meanwhile, India’s decision under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to grant asylum to the Dalai Lama deepened tensions, culminating in the 1962 war between China and India — a conflict shaped not just by borders but by Cold War alignments.

By the 1980s, as the Soviet Union began to unravel, the West turned its attention to China’s own internal discontent. The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests became a lightning rod for hopes of regime collapse. That same year, the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama was viewed in Beijing as Western meddling cloaked in liberal ideals.

I recall warning Chinese delegates in 1987, during a dinner hosted by the Chinese Students’ Association in Pittsburgh, not to fall into what I called “the American trap.” I cautioned that China’s periodic upheavals had never resulted in the military’s sidelining — the PLA had always remained central.

In Tiananmen, protestors erected a replica of the Statue of Liberty. Western observers predicted revolution. Yet, despite Deng Xiaoping’s repudiation of the Cultural Revolution, Maoist slogans resurfaced on both sides of the protest. When the PLA intervened, hopes of another Hong Kong-like colonial chapter for China were decisively crushed.

China instead pursued a unique trajectory. Deng’s reforms spurred dramatic economic growth while maintaining centralised political control. The Soviet collapse was avoided not by liberalisation but by learning from it.

Under Xi Jinping, China has continued that trajectory — and then some. His speeches at the CPC Centenary and Party Congress underline three key aims: to reinforce the CPC’s Marxist-Leninist foundations, complete what Beijing calls the “unfinished revolution” by reunifying Taiwan (peacefully or by force), and transition from wealth accumulation to “common prosperity.” Unlike his predecessors, Xi has not distanced himself from the Cultural Revolution, but instead has embraced Mao’s legacy alongside Deng’s reforms.

As China has grown into a global power — economically, militarily, and diplomatically — the Western narrative has shifted. Confrontation now takes place not only in military terms, but in the realm of information: disinformation campaigns, think tank briefings, and editorial fear-mongering.

But these stories rarely reflect the political structure they purport to analyse.

China’s power rests on three interlinked institutions: the Communist Party, the State, and the Military. All three are led by Xi Jinping — as General Secretary of the Party, President of the State, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC).

Unlike in many Western systems, China’s military — the People’s Liberation Army — is not subordinate to the state. It answers directly to the Party, through the CMC. The idea of a military coup, where generals depose a civilian leader, misunderstands this setup entirely. In China, there is no such division.

The recurring coup narrative is thus a projection — a product of Western liberal assumptions imposed on a system that does not fit them.

Yes, China faces internal dissent, elite factionalism, and policy challenges, as all large countries do. But rumours of Xi’s downfall are not rooted in on-the-ground reality. They are geopolitical wishful thinking.

As the global order becomes increasingly multipolar and narrative warfare intensifies, foreign policy debates must be grounded in structure, not fantasy. A deeper, more informed understanding of China’s political system is not only overdue — it’s essential.

Prof. Suresh Deman is Honorary Director at the Centre for Economics & Finance, a UNEP/UNCTAD Consultant, and Visiting Professor. He writes on international political economy, China’s foreign policy, and strategic affairs.

 

Social Media Trial based on Presumption of Guilty

Justice Hurried and Justice Denied - Social Media Trial based on Presumption of Guilty 

Lenin's Tallest Tribute - John Read's: Ten Days that Shook the World

 A Tribute to Lenin: The Revolutionary Who Rewired the World

1. Origins of a Revolutionary

In an age when empires seemed eternal and monarchs ruled by divine right, a quiet boy from Simbirsk—born on April 22, 1870—began asking dangerous yet thought-provoking questions. His name was Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, but history would remember him simply as Lenin—the man who dared to challenge one of the world’s most powerful empires, forged by Tsar Alexander III, and ultimately restructured the operating system of civilization.

2. Ideas Over Vengeance

Long before hashtags, TikTok, and viral manifestos, Lenin was laying the groundwork for a revolution that would resonate into the digital age. The execution of his older brother, Alexander—a journalist executed for attempting to assassinate Tsar Alexander III—profoundly impacted him. Yet Vladimir did not retreat into despair or seek vengeance. He turned instead to revolutionary ideas—seeking not blood, but the end of a brutal empire.

To Lenin, ideas were mightier than weapons. He studied law and passed the bar in 1892, briefly becoming a lawyer. However, his immersion in Marxist circles soon drew him deep into revolutionary activism.

3. The Making of a Marxist

In the mid-1890s, Lenin opposed the Narodnik belief that Russia could leap over capitalism into socialism. He argued that capitalism was already taking root in Russia and needed to be addressed strategically. In 1895, his activities led to arrest and exile in Siberia, where he spent three years and married fellow revolutionary Nadezhda Krupskaya.

But Siberia could not suppress him, and exile did not silence him. On the contrary, it strengthened his resolve.

4. Organizing in Exile

Across Europe—in libraries and cafés thick with smoke and political theory—Lenin wrote, organized, and strategized. He launched Iskra ("The Spark"), a newspaper intended to ignite revolution across the Russian Empire. While Tsars clung to their thrones and the West plunged into World War I (1914–1917), Lenin sharpened his vision of a state without kings or capitalists—a state where the workers controlled the levers of power. This was the foundation of what he called the dictatorship of the proletariat.

5. The Revolution of 1917

In 1917, the old world cracked. War-weary and starving, Russia teetered on collapse. Into this chaos, Lenin returned—his passage through Germany sealed in a train, courtesy of the very enemies who hoped to destabilize Russia. Ironically, they accelerated one of history’s sharpest plot twists.

The Menshevik-led February Revolution had ended the monarchy, but that was not enough for Lenin. In October, he led the Bolsheviks in a swift and nearly bloodless coup that overthrew the Provisional Government. From the Winter Palace to the furthest Siberian outposts, power shifted overnight. The world stood stunned.

6. Architect of the Soviet State

As the first head of the Soviet state, Lenin moved quickly: abolishing private land ownership, pulling Russia out of the war, and beginning to construct the machinery of a planned economy. Yet revolution, like fire, often consumes its bearer. Worn down by strokes and political intrigue, he withdrew from public life in 1922 and died two years later, aged just 53—his mind a fading echo of its former brilliance.

7. Revolutionary Software

His slogans—"Peace, Land, Bread" and "All Power to the Soviets"—were not mere political catchphrases. They were data packets of revolutionary software: simple, elegant, and designed to overwrite the old system. With surgical precision, Lenin and the Bolsheviks launched the world’s first successful Marxist revolution. John Reed’s Ten Days That Shook the World remains one of the century’s greatest political-literary achievements, capturing the revolution through the eyes of a witness.

8. Reality Bites the Dream

Lenin's utopia clashed with harsh realities. Civil war, foreign intervention, famine, and dissent battered the fledgling Soviet Union. To stabilize the nation, Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP)—a tactical compromise with capitalism that shocked purist Marxists but reflected his pragmatic nature.

Lenin was never a rigid ideologue; he was a coder rewriting a crashing system. His seminal works—Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, What Is to Be Done?, Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, and his theses at the First International—challenged existing orthodoxy. One of his key positions on the Third World and India, originally contested by an Indian communist intellectual, was later accepted by Lenin himself, showcasing his intellectual flexibility.

9. A Legacy Beyond Borders

By the time of his death in 1924, Lenin had transformed not only Russia but also the trajectory of global politics. His legacy is a paradox: liberator and autocrat, idealist and realist, hero and heretic. Though the Soviet Union eventually collapsed, Lenin's ideas lived on—in anti-colonial movements across the Global South, in debates over inequality, and in enduring questions about the distribution of power and wealth.

10. The Modern Lens

Lenin left no ordinary legacy. His mausoleum became a shrine, his doctrine a political religion, and his image a global symbol. Whether revered or reviled, Vladimir Lenin remains a titan of revolution—a man who reshaped society from the ground up, wielding ideology like a hammer and determination like a sickle.

In a 21st-century world governed by data, networks, and decentralization, Lenin's legacy is being re-examined—not merely as a figure of the past, but as an early hacker of global structures. Whether you view him as a visionary or a cautionary tale, Lenin remains a towering figure in modern history—proof that ideas, when sharpened by experience and wielded with purpose, can still shake the world.

Russia-India Relations - A Global Shift

 

Russia-India Relations: A Strategic Shift in Global Geopolitics

S Deman*

Abstract

A Love Story

India's recent strategic overture toward Russia, reportedly accepting a significant geopolitical offer, signals a notable shift in international alignments. This development not only strengthens the bilateral relationship between the two long-standing partners but also has far-reaching implications for global geopolitics, military strategies, and the balance of power. This paper examines the motivations behind India’s decision, the scope of the emerging agreement, and the international responses it could trigger. It evaluates the benefits and risks involved for India, explore the broader impact on international institutions such as BRICS, and consider how this evolving partnership might reshape the global order.

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Introduction

A seismic shift is underway in global geopolitics. India has reportedly accepted a substantial and unprecedented offer from Russia—an action that could potentially recalibrate the balance of power in Asia and beyond. As Western powers seek to contain Russia following the Ukraine conflict, India's decision to deepen its strategic ties with Moscow marks a significant departure from its previously cautious diplomacy. This paper explores the motivations, content, and consequences of this move, as well as its implications for the global order.

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The Nature of the Agreement

1. Defense and Technology Transfer

At the heart of the agreement is an expansive defense cooperation framework, reportedly involving advanced military technologies. Speculation suggests Russia has offered India not only weapons platforms but also full-scale technology transfers. These could include next-generation combat aircraft, hypersonic missiles, air defense systems, and submarine components. This aligns with India's "Atmanirbhar Bharat" (self-reliant India) initiative, enhancing domestic production capacity and reducing long-term reliance on foreign imports.

2. Energy Security

Another major component is a long-term energy partnership involving preferential pricing on Russian oil and gas. Amidst global energy volatility, access to reliable and affordable energy is crucial for sustaining India's economic growth. The deal may also include alternative financial mechanisms such as rupee-ruble trade arrangements, insulating both countries from Western sanctions.

3. Diplomatic and Strategic Alignment

India's alignment with Russia also signals closer diplomatic cooperation in global forums such as the United Nations and BRICS. This is seen as an attempt to challenge Western hegemony and promote a more multipolar world order.

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Historical Context: The India-Russia Partnership

India-Russia relations are built on a foundation of trust, strategic alignment, and historical goodwill dating back to the Cold War era. During a time when India struggled to secure advanced defense technology from Western nations, the Soviet Union emerged as a reliable partner, supplying critical equipment and diplomatic support—most notably through the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation.

The co-development of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile exemplifies the success of this partnership. Even today, over 60% of India’s defense equipment originates from Russia or the former Soviet Union, creating a lasting interdependence. This historical cooperation sets the stage for the present deepening of ties.

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Strategic Timing and Motivations

1. Assertion of Strategic Autonomy

Western pressure to distance itself from Moscow has paradoxically strengthened India’s resolve to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy. By embracing a deeper relationship with Russia, India is asserting its strategic independence.

2. Security Concerns: The China Factor

The ongoing border tensions with China, particularly in the Himalayas, necessitate rapid military modernization. Russia, unlike Western suppliers, may be more willing to offer cutting-edge technologies without bureaucratic or geopolitical constraints.

3. BRICS and the Multipolar Vision

India's growing role within an expanded BRICS provides a conducive platform for deeper cooperation with Russia. The two nations, alongside others, aim to reduce dependency on Western institutions by promoting trade in national currencies and strengthening the New Development Bank.

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Global Reactions

1. Western Powers

The United States and NATO allies are likely to perceive this development as a threat to their Indo-Pacific strategy, where India plays a pivotal role in countering China. Potential repercussions could include diplomatic pressure, sanctions under CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act), and revaluations of defense and technology partnerships.

The European Union may echo these concerns, raising the possibility of trade frictions and political misalignment.

2. China

While China may welcome a disruption in U.S.-led alliances, it may also be wary of Russian military technology empowering a regional rival. This could strain the China-Russia dynamic.

3. Middle East and Global South

Countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia may view the India-Russia axis as a stabilizing force and a potential boost to regional initiatives like the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

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Implications for India: Benefits and Risks

Potential Benefits

• Strategic Autonomy: Reinforces India's independent foreign policy stance.
• Energy Security: Access to discounted Russian energy helps curb inflation and reduce trade deficits.
• Defense Modernization: Enhances indigenous capabilities and military deterrence.
• Economic Growth: Boosts industrial competitiveness under initiatives like “Make in India.”

Key Risks

• Sanctions and Diplomatic Fallout: Potential U.S. and EU sanctions could affect investment and critical technologies.
• Strain on Key Alliances: Partnerships within the Quad (US, Japan, Australia, and India) may suffer.
• Domestic Political Challenges: Aligning closely with a globally criticized regime could stir internal debate.

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Future Outlook: What Happens Next?

India’s acceptance of Russia's strategic offer is only the beginning. The global response—especially from Washington—will heavily influence the direction of this new alignment. If met with harsh retaliation, India may pivot further toward non-Western partners and reinforce BRICS-related initiatives such as de-dollarization, national currency trade, and governance reform.

Expect increased India-Russia military collaboration, joint research, and potentially greater intelligence sharing. This could further entrench the partnership and act as a catalyst for a broader shift in the global power structure—from a unipolar to a multipolar order.

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Conclusion

India’s decision to deepen its partnership with Russia represents a calculated gamble—balancing geopolitical risks with strategic imperatives. It reflects a desire to maintain autonomy, secure national interests, and reshape its global role amidst a turbulent international environment. Whether this will usher in a new global order or provoke new conflicts remains to be seen. What is certain is that the India-Russia alliance will play a pivotal role in shaping the contours of 21st-century geopolitics.

 

* Director, Centre fir Econ & Finance, London

References

1.             Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. India-Russia Relations. New Delhi: MEA, 2024. https://mea.gov.in/india-russia.htm

2.             Stratfor. "Russia’s Strategic Partnerships in Asia." RAND Corporation, 2023. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1621-1.html

3.             Krishnan, Murali. "India’s Energy Ties with Russia Deepen Despite Western Pressure." The Hindu, March 15, 2024. https://www.thehindu.com

4.             Mukherjee, Arpita. "India to Buy Russian Oil in Rupees to Sidestep Sanctions." Reuters, April 10, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/india-russian-oil-rupees

5.             Saran, Shyam. India’s Quest for Strategic Autonomy: A Diplomatic Balancing Act. New Delhi: Carnegie India, 2023. https://carnegieindia.org/2023/11/20/indias-strategic-autonomy

 

 

RUSSO-UKRAINE CONFLICT - WESTERN INTERVENTIONISM

A Historical Perspective on NATO, Russia, and Western Interventionism                                                                                                                                                                                                    Europe in general—and the UK in particular—continue to suffer from a deep-rooted Russophobia. To this day, no solid evidence has been provided by President Biden or any Western leader to support claims of Russian interference in European affairs or in Donald Trump’s first presidential election.

Historically, Kyiv was the capital of ancient Rus'. Crimea, meanwhile, was handed over to Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev due to his Ukrainian heritage. Even Mikhail Gorbachev had Ukrainian roots. Following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the U.S.-led NATO alliance began to unilaterally expand, bully, invade, and orchestrate CIA-backed coups and regime changes around the world. According to a report by a group of professors at Brown University, the U.S. has intervened in 97 countries since then.

In the early post-Soviet years, Russia was governed by Boris Yeltsin—a weak and ineffectual leader, often ridiculed for his drunken behavior. Under his leadership, the country fell into disarray. Key public sector enterprises were sold off for peanuts, often to oligarchs with close ties to the West. Many of these individuals, particularly of Jewish background, took their money and moved to Germany, Finland, the U.S., and possibly even France.

When Gorbachev agreed to German unification, it was on the condition that NATO would not expand eastward. Later, Western leaders backed away from this commitment, claiming there was no formal written agreement.

Fast forward to 2008: at the NATO summit in Bucharest, the alliance declared that both Ukraine and Georgia would one day become members—yet provided no roadmap. Despite repeated warnings from President Putin, NATO kept pushing eastward. Five countries joined first, followed by seven more that encircled Russia. The only remaining access point for Russia to the rest of Europe was through Ukraine—a border stretching over 2,000 kilometers.

In 2014, NATO’s involvement in Ukraine escalated after the Maidan coup, widely viewed as U.S.-supported. This further inflamed tensions. Then came the Minsk Agreements, signed by France’s President Macron and Germany’s Chancellor Merkel, which were supposed to de-escalate the situation. However, in 2022, both leaders admitted their real aim was to buy time to arm Ukraine and prepare for conflict—a clear act of bad faith.

In April 2022, during peace talks in Istanbul, an agreement was nearly reached to end the conflict. However, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson flew to Kyiv on the orders of Washington to persuade President Zelensky not to sign the deal—prolonging the war unnecessarily.

Putin’s requests to address Russia’s security concerns were consistently ignored by the West. Left with no diplomatic path, he was forced to act to secure Russia's sovereignty—no longer the weak state it was in the 1990s.

NATO’s track record speaks volumes: from the bombing and dismantling of Yugoslavia with the support of far-right groups, to the 1990 invasion of Iraq, the 2001 war in Afghanistan, and the 2003 re-invasion of Iraq that led to the deaths of over half a million civilians. The West also backed extremist groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Syria, and orchestrated the brutal killing of Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi.

This cycle of regime change and destruction was not going to be allowed to continue—at least not without resistance. Of course, the West may have the last word in the media, but perhaps some of us will have the last laugh when history writes its final verdict.

TRIBUTE TO SUNITI KUMAR GHOSH : ONE OF THE GREATEST MARXIST HISTORIANS

Tribute to Suniti Kumar Ghosh: One of India’s most outstanding

Marxist Historians

Harsh Thakor*

May 11^th we commemorated the 10^th death anniversary of one of the greatest-ever Marxist intellectuals. Suniti Kumar Ghosh. I was privileged to have personally met him in Kolkata in March; 2009.

Applying Marxist mode, in diverse spheres he classically delved into a refuting distortion of Indian history and the autocracy of the Indian state

I greatly admire his tenacity in the most adverse of situations to refute the ruling class and revisionist propaganda and still never going overboard. When many intellectuals fell into the quagmire of bankruptcy after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 Ghosh stood relentless like a rock. Till the very end, he grappled with the problems and concerns of the rebuilding of the communist revolutionary movement in India.

EARLY LIFE

Suniti Kumar Ghosh was born on 18 February 1918 in the Sibpur area of district Howrah in West Bengal. After matriculating from the B K Paul Institution, Sibpur, he joined St. Paul's College, Kolkata, and received his BA with honours in English literature and an MA degree in English from the University of Calcutta. He adopted teaching as his career and taught at nearly eleven colleges encompassing East and West Bengal as also Bihar. He was an active participant in the Tebhaga movement (l946-47) and joined the Communist Party of India (CPI).

POLITICAL LIFE

Suniti Kumar Ghosh joined the Communist Party of India (Marxist) sometime after its formation in 1964 and was associated with the editorial boards of Desh Hitaishi and People's Democracy—the two organs of the CPI(M). Being disappointed by the CPM’s revisionist he revolted against it he associated with a radical Bengali periodical (magazine) known as Kalpurush along with Saroj Datta and others. He wrote a series of articles that reflected the ideology of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China and the impact of Mao Tse-Tung's Thoughts on it.

The 'Naxalbari, propelled Sunitibabu into action. He accepted the role of editor of organs such as Deshabrati and Liberation which propagated the mass-line of the Indian revolution and became highly popular.  

He was an integral part of the movement for the rest of the decade, and only returned home when burnt to the last straw. In that decade of the revolutionary movement not only his family (his wife Anima and his two daughters, but he was subjected to turmoil.. He never forgot the martyrs of that movement, to whom he dedicated several of his writings. “I owe to those who, sharing my ideals and braving immense risks, gave me shelter and food when shelter was more precious than food.”

In 1974 Ghosh was instrumental in the formation of the Central Organising Committee of the CPI (ML), which made a constructive self-criticism of past errors of CPI (ML).  In 1977 he officially left the party stating.

“The COC held that the battle of annihilation of class enemies, carried out by secret squads of militants, cannot solve our problems nor can it serve as the beginning of the guerrilla war. That is why the COC considered it necessary "to participate in and lead mass struggles of the people on all fronts – economic, political and cultural – and establish the Party's political leadership over mass organizations to organize armed struggles of the peasantry based on an Agrarian Programme and for building up base areas in the countryside.“

2^ND PHASE

Thereafter he ventured on a second phase, in which he methodically welded a treasure house of literature: The Indian Big Bourgeoisie: Its Genesis, Growth and Character (1985, then revised and enlarged in 2000); India and the Raj 1919-1947: Glory, Shame and Bondage (vol. 1: 1989; vol. 2: RUPE, 1995; re-published as a single volume in 2007 by Sahitya Samsad); The Historic Turning-Point: A Liberation Anthology (in two volumes,1992 and 1993); The Tragic Partition of Bengal (2002); Naxalbari – Before and After: Reminiscences and Appraisal (2009). Apart from these, he published several shorter publications or booklets: Development Planning in India: Lumpen Development and Imperialism (RUPE, 1997, 2002); Imperialism’s Tightening Grip on Indian Agriculture (1998); India’s Constitution and Its Review (RUPE, 2001); The Himalayan Adventure: India-China War of 1962 – Causes and Consequences (RUPE, 2002); and India’s in journals such as Aspects of India’s Economy, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Economic and Political Weekly, Frontier, Monthly Review, and Visvabharati Quarterly. He dipped his pen as late as 2010, at the age of 92, after which his body simply gave in.

Since the 1980s, Ghosh was not politically active and did not formally belong to any political organization, but handed over the baton to those activists who waged revolutionary struggles in the following years. His academic vigour and political activism were intertwined. The root of his academic work was the Naxalbari struggle, and his academic work planted the theoretical breeding ground for the activists to bloom in the later phases of the revolutionary movement.

His arduous toil in the second phase were never ends in themselves; but part and parcel of serving the same cause to which he devoted his energies in the earlier phase. Now no longer in a position to directly participate in the revolutionary movement, he took up the mantle of neglected political tasks of that movement as if it was his very duty, in particular, the analysis and substantiation of the character of India’s ruling classes, the nature of modern India’s historical development and political economy, the revolutionary struggles of the Indian people to transform Indian society, and the political leadership of that revolutionary movement. No author has as classically analyzed the nature of the Indian big bourgeoisie.

He nourished revolutionary optimism at every juncture and placed unwavering faith in an India emancipated from exploitation and that the Indian Communist revolutionary movement would emerge triumphant sometime in the near or distant future. Many of his old associates were disillusioned with the future of the Indian revolution and joined the reactionary camp, but Ghosh never relented in holding the baton of the ideals he cherished. No intellectual gave the politics of Naxalbari such a concrete frame or shape to revive its politics.

SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT BOOKS BY GHOSH   

 In India and the Raj 1919-1947, no historian has as analytically diagnosed the collusion or complicit role of the bourgeoisie with imperialism and exploded the myth of conventional historiography of 1947 independence as Suniti Ghosh did. He surgically contrasts the domain of the politics of the people of revolutionary violence with the domain of elite politics, which seeks to secure a place within the social order.

The book investigated Gandhi’s early experiments with Satygagraha, the collaboration of the Indian bourgeoisie with imperialism, the repression in Jallianwala Bagh and Chauri-Chaura, civil and criminal disobedience, the hypocrisy of nonviolent nationalism and goals and strategies of the Congress. In his book, he illustrated how the Gandhi-led Congress consistently acted on the behest or patronized the industrialists and landlords, as well as appeased religious politics and a grounded analysis illustrated how the Congress was devoid of genuine mass character and never took into its fold genuine anti-colonial uprisings. He projects the economics of a comprador bourgeoisie with intrinsic detail that did not divorce links with imperialism and explained how Congress leaders appeased or operated in hand and glove with the landlord classes. Ghosh evaluated how the Tat as, Birlas, or Singhanias acted as brokers for British capital and differentiated the comprador bourgeoisie from the national bourgeoisie.

In  ‘Himalayan Adventure –India-China 1962 War, Ghosh most comprehensively analyzed how it was India or Nehru who was on the offensive in the 1962 Indo-China War, by violating the McMahan line agreement. Even some Indian generals admitted this. He extensively quotes Neville Maxwell.

Ghosh logically probed the collusion of superpowers, the USSR and the US to conspire against China and promote Indian expansionism. They backed India’s declaring war on China and India’s claim over Tibet, which was part of China. Earlier appeals from China for negotiations for a peaceful settlement found no echo in the hearts of the Nehru.  However, in 1960 Nehru agreed to Chou En-lai’s proposal to meet. The Chinese prime minister accompanied by Chen Yi, China’s foreign minister, came to India in April 1960 to negotiate a peaceful settlement.  However, the hosts were not quite friendly; Nehru had assured the Indian hawks that there would be ‘talks’ but no ‘negotiations’. The decision of the Indian ruling classes to go to war with China was, as the Times of India noted, a political decision – a decision that conflicted with military advice. This political decision invited a rebuff from China under which the Indian army, the Indian government, and Nehru reeled.  In a short span of  20-24 October, the Chinese forces overran Indian positions, penetrated the NEFA territory, and occupied Towang (not far south of the McMahon line), but halted and again began diplomatic exchanges.  But Nehru was his old self-righteous, apt to turn truth on its head and determined not to enter into negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the boundary problem.

In Naxalbari before and after, in incisive detail, Ghosh made a balanced appraisal of the CPI ((ML), formed in 1969. Most illustratively, he showed how Naxalbari revolutionized Indian history and how the party shaped the rebellion of all oppressed classes. Ghosh most dwelled in his analysis of how the movement was based on the mass character and how it was a turning point in the history of India. He projected how the party, uprising, and masses were an integral part of revolutionary change and symmetrical synthesis of the party with the armed struggle and mass movement.

Although a great admirer of Charu Mazumdar, CPI(ML), and Naxalbari , Ghosh was critical of left adventurism’. He refuted the abandoning of mass organizations and movements, the path of ‘annihilation of the class enemy ‘, and the party's authoritarianism which was unable to obstruct all forces to converge. Instead of placing the blame on Charu Mazumdar solely, he asserted that the fault of the setback was due to a lack of collective leadership.

He dwells on the crystallization of the evolution of the Naxalbari revolt into the broader ideological zone, illustrating the dichotomy between the theory of armed struggle and the peaceful, parliamentary road to socialism.

Ghosh’s critique lucidly portrays the leader’s autocratic style of functioning, while it has no reflection of factional rivalry or personal bitterness. His book revealed that Mazumdar negated from the party the criticism of his line by Zhou Enlai and Kang Sheng, the two top CPC leaders, when the former emissary, Souren Bose, met them in Beijing in mid-1970.

In India’s Constitution and Its Review Suniti made a scientific dissection of the essence of the Indian Constitution, portraying its class character, exploring how the Constitution could not protect the genuine rights of the people and how in practice lot of what was enshrined was nonexistent.

WEAKNESSES

In my personal view, Ghosh failed to analyze in what ways the path of the Indian revolution had unique characteristics being divergent from the Chinese path of people's war or how its semi-feudalism erred.

 I also disagree with his evaluation that the 1947 independence was a mere transfer of power or his complete negation of the role of MK Gandhi as a colonial agent, denying his role in bridging the link of Congress with the masses.

However penetrative his analysis was Ghosh failed to expose the autocratic nature of the formation of the CPI (ML) in 1969 or give comrades like Tarimela Nagi Reddy, DV Rao,  Kanu Sanyal, Kanhai Chaterjee or organizations like the  Andhra Pradesh Coordination Committee or Dakshin Desh, their proper due contribution to the revolutionary movement.

*A freelance Journalist. Thanks for the information from the Research Unit for Political Economy and Amit Bhattacharya in Frontier Weekly. He personally met Suniti Kumar Ghosh in Kolkata in 2009.